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Abstract
This online supplement contains peer-reviewed material that
would not fit in the PSA 2010 Proceedings article, Twardy
and Korb (2011). That article presents a probabilistic
extension of active-path analyses of actual causation. The
extension uses “soft” interventions (Korb et al., 2004) as the
analog of resetting path variables to their actual value. Soft
interventions allow the “actual value” to be a probability
distribution. The resulting account can handle at least as
wide a range of examples as the original accounts, without
assuming determinism.
A Additional Detail
Figure for Bottle example (Section 2)
Figure 1 accompanies the following text, which appeared in the Bottle example
at the end of Section 2, just after Definition 8.
In the extended bottle-smashing model, Suzy’s throw ST = 1
remains an actual cause of BS = 1 using a redundancy range to
reveal the dependency. Choosing {BT,BH} as our background, and
setting BH = 0, we see that ST makes a difference. Resetting has
no effect because actually SH = 1.
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Figure 1: Modified bottle example showing the background in a box, and the rest
variable with an asterisk. BH = Billy hits; BS = bottle shatters; BT = Billy throws;
SH = Suzy hits; ST = Suzy throws.
Figure for The Trainee Assassin (Section 4.2)
Figure 4 shows the model for the deterministic version of Trainee Assassin
presented in Section 4.2. Recall that Trainee T shoots at a victim V , but
Supervisor will shoot if Trainee loses nerve. Being deterministic, Victim survives
only when neither shot is fired. In the actual case, the trainee shoots, the
supervisor does not, and the victim dies. As with Boulder, there is no marginal
effect, but any path-based account works, because the path T −−I V is strongly
active.
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T = 1
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V = ¬T ∧ ¬S
Figure 2: Trainee Assassin example. T = Trainee shoots, S = Supervisor shoots,
V = Victim survives.
B The Background is Not a Cause
The redundancy range analysis of Hitchcock amounts to asserting that the
background is not a cause, which leads to a unified notation for treating cause
and context.
|∆1| = |Pr(e|Ic,b)− Pr(e|Ic′,b)| > ε
|∆2| = |Pr(e|Ib,c)− Pr(e|Ib′,c)| ≤ ε
Define ∆:
∆(x, y, z) = Pr(e|Ix,z)− Pr(e|Iy,z)
where notionally, x is the cause c, y is the contrast c′ and z is the actual
background. Then:
|∆1| = |∆(c, c′,b)| > ε
|∆2| = |∆(b,b′, c)| ≤ ε
If c (vs c′) is an actual cause of e, there must be a redundant background b′ where
c vs c′ makes a difference. Asserting redundancy amounts to saying the
background b′ vs actual background b is not itself a cause:
|∆2| = |∆(b,b′, c)| ≤ ε
The condition is trivially satisfied if b = b′. An implication is that if c is a cause,
ε is constrained by the relative probabilities of c vs c′ and b vs b′.
C Probabilistic Boulder
Figure 3: Probabilistic version of Boulder, where Hiker Survives (S=1) is stochas-
tic. Here, Boulder Falls (F=1) is also an actual cause. Holding fixed that Hiker
Ducks (D=1), F=1 decreases the chances of survival relative to F=0.
We can deal with the original Probabilistic Boulder without resetting. As before,
D is an actual cause. If we suppose F
.9−−I D, then everything proceeds as
before, and D makes a difference; but F does not make a difference, because the
direct arc F −−I S is inactive (by setting b′ : D = 1), and we have no
background variable that could block F −−I S and isolate F −−I D −−I S.
However, if we add noise at S, so that ducking no longer guarantees survival, we
find an influence for F . Suppose that the conditional probability table (CPT) at S
is:
F D Pr(S = 1)
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 .01
1 1 .8
Given that the hiker ducked, F = 1 reduces the chances of survival relative to
F = 0, as we can see in figure 3. But that is just what we would expect.
Of course, F = 1 is not an actual cause of S = 1. It is rather a counterfactual
cause of S = 0 —i.e., a counterfactual preventer of S = 1. By always requiring
that actually E = e (S = 1 in this case), the accounts of Halpern & Pearl and
Hitchcock deny F in this case the status of actual cause. PAP, however, finds it to
be active, which we consider to be more appropriate. The awkwardness of
calling a Falling Boulder an actual cause of Survival, when its activity all pulls in
the opposite direction, is handled in English by such locutions as: “The hiker
survived despite the boulder falling.” The existence of such locutions supports,
rather than undermines, the status of falling boulders as actual causes in such
cases. The inclusion of the clause requiring for actual causation that E = e is an
attempt to cater for ordinary linguistic practices, which is out of place in analyses
of causal metaphysics, as we have previously suggested (Twardy and Korb,
2004).
D The Voting Machine
The Voting Machine example (Halpern and Pearl, 2004, Example A.3) showed
that Hitchcock’s redundancy range account (H2) was too strict in requiring that φ
be unchanged. Consequently, Halpern & Pearl replaced that requirement with
what we have called here resetting ranges.
Their voting scenario has two people, V1 and V2, vote, and the measure passes
(P ) if at least one votes in favor. Votes are counted by a voting machine M , so
that the votes affect passage only via M . Actually, both vote in favor, and the
measure passes. It is said that both votes should count as causes.
M
P
V1 V2
V1 = 1
V2 = 1
M = V1 + V2
P = M ≥ 1
Figure 4: Voting Machine: V1 = Vote 1, V2 = Vote 2, M = Voting Machine, and P
= Measure Passes.
To review Halpern & Pearl’s analysis, consider V1. In the actual background
V2 = 1, and V1 made no difference. Let V2 = 0, which is clearly in the
redundancy range. Now V1 = 0 results in P = 0, but V1 = 1 results in P = 1
even if (only if!) M is reset to its actual state, M = 1. So V1 = 1 is an actual
cause, and by symmetry, so is V2 = 1.
We can match their result, but we think the solution is not entirely satisfactory.
On this analysis, V1 = 1 would be an actual cause no matter how many other
votes were cast: setting all other votes to 0 is still in the redundancy range. But as
the number of votes N goes to infinity, the conclusion becomes increasingly
implausible.
As before, we might seek refuge in probabilities, but to no avail. Suppose that all
votes are in favor, but that each vote has a 10% chance of being tallied as against
the measure. Whether that 10% is the chance of voting against the measure or
being incorrectly tallied should not matter. For the case with two votes, consider
V1:
Background ∆1 ∆2
Actual: V2 = 1 .09 0
Redundant: V2 = 0 .9 .09
V1 is an actual cause for all reasonable values of ε. If ε < .09, then V1 is an actual
cause in the actual background, because it has a small ∆1 that is nevertheless
greater than ε. If ε is greater than that, but less than 0.9, then V1 is an actual
cause in a redundant background, where it has a large effect. We think that
ε > 0.9 is not reasonable.
The general case with N positive votes can be treated as a binomial experiment
with N trials, each with probability of success p. Therefore the mean and
variance of M are µ = Np, and σ2 = Np(1− p). Let q = 1− p, in our case, 0.1.
The probability the measure will fail is qN , and the difference made by 1 vote is
roughly qN−1, which becomes vanishingly small. The distribution for 4 votes is
shown here:
For ε = 0, of course each vote is an actual cause, but with a contribution rapidly
approaching 0.
For all numbers of positive votes N , for moderate ε < p, each vote is still an
actual cause. This is because we can always find a redundant background of k
opposing votes where ∆2 < ε, but where the loss of one more vote (V1) makes
∆1 > ε. This is because the counterfactual change from N to N ′ = N − k
positive votes will be an order of magnitude smaller than the subsequent change
to N ′ − 1 positive votes.
However, for a fixed ε, as N gets larger, the plausibility of N ′ becomes smaller.
In the case where N = 10, the counterfactual N ′ = 4 has only a .014% chance
(.00014 probability) of occurring.
It would seem that the binary judgment of “actual cause” has to be supplemented
with a notion of causal strength (see, e.g., Korb et al., 2011).
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